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Abstract
Integration has become a recurring theme of national immigration policies; and there has been a corre-
sponding normative development of the concept to a certain degree in the European Union, both in soft 
policy and through references to integration in legally binding immigration measures. Th e diffi  culty in 
defi ning integration is a pervasive problem encountered by lawyers and sociologists attempting to under-
stand the phenomenon. Th is article argues that the development of the concept of integration by the 
European Court of Human Rights has an important contribution to make to the debate, with the poten-
tial to provide a legal framework within which to situate integration policies at the national and the EU 
level. It assesses the concept of integration employed by the European Court of Human Rights, analysing 
the Court’s Article 8 immigration jurisprudence in terms of two core issues: fi rst, the conception of inte-
gration employed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights; and second, the impli-
cations of the development of the concept in terms of impacting on the right to remain in a State Party 
and family reunifi cation, each a key integration issue. Th e article concludes that while the jurisprudence 
relating to what actually constitutes ‘integration’ is very much in its infancy, the express consideration of 
integration as a factor in the balancing exercise undertaken by the Court in the expulsion cases signifi es 
the start of a normative development of the concept of integration by the European Court of Human 
Rights. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the increased emphasis of the Court on the integra-
tion criterion in the Article 8 expulsion cases infl uences the Court’s approach to key integration issues 
such as family reunifi cation and in turn whether this fi lters down to legislators and policymakers at the 
national level.
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1. Introduction
Integration has become a recurring theme of national immigration policies;1 and 
there has been a corresponding normative development of the concept to a cer-
tain degree in the European Union, both in soft policy and through references to 
1) For an analysis of European integration policies see for example the contributions in Elspeth Guild, 
Kees Groenendijk and Sergio Carrera, Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in 
the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate 2009); see also Sergio Carrera, A Comparison of Integration Programmes in the 
EU: Trends and Weaknesses (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies 2006).
Downloaded from Brill.com01/22/2020 10:31:46AM
via Maynooth University
24 C. Murphy / European Journal of Migration and Law 12 (2010) 23–43
integration in legally binding immigration measures.2 Th e diffi  culty in defi ning 
integration is a pervasive problem encountered by lawyers and sociologists 
attempting to understand the phenomenon, “hindering coherent policy develop-
ment and productive public debate”.3 Th is article argues that the development of 
the concept of integration by the European Court of Human Rights has an 
important contribution to make to the debate, with the potential to provide a 
legal framework within which to situate integration policies at the national and 
the EU level. 
Th e Strasbourg Court has been grappling with integration issues in a diff erent 
context to national and European policy-makers and legislators: that of the nega-
tive obligation of States under Article 8 not to expel long-term residents in certain 
circumstances; and the positive obligation of states- again under Article 8 – to 
authorise family reunifi cation in certain circumstances. Attention has been 
focused to date on the inconsistencies and defi ciencies of this jurisprudence from 
the perspective of immigration law generally. In contrast, the focus of this article 
is on illustrating the importance of this well-known body of judgments to gaining 
an insight into the elusive concept of integration. Th e article assesses the concept 
of integration employed by the European Court of Human Rights, analysing the 
jurisprudence in terms of two core issues: fi rst, the conception of integration 
employed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights; and 
second, the implications of the development of the concept in terms of impacting 
on the right to remain in a State Party and family reunifi cation, each a key inte-
gration issue. 
Th e jurisprudence has established that integration does not give rise to a dis-
crete legal category: immigrants who have spent most or all of their lives in a 
country remain in the same broad legal category as all immigrants. Nevertheless, 
the Strasbourg Court now explicitly takes into account the fact of integration in 
determining whether an expulsion decision violates Article 8 and in this sense 
integration leads to an increased level of protection from expulsion. Having estab-
lished these starting points, the article goes on to outline the contours of the 
Court’s conception of integration, which emerge quite clearly from the case law. 
It is argued that the Court’s integration paradigm appears to place the onus of 
integration on the migrant rather than focussing on States’ responsibilities to 
ensuring the integration of immigrant communities. However, the aspects of 
2) See generally Sergio Carrera, In Search of the Perfect Citizen? Th e Intersection between Integration, Immi-
gration and Nationality in the EU (Martinus Nijhoff , 2009); see also Helene Urth, “Building a Momen-
tum for the Integration of Th ird-Country Nationals in the European Union”, (2005) 7 EJML 163, 
p. 164. See also Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunifi cation; Directive 2003/109/EC of 
25 November 2003 on a long-term resident status for third country nationals who have legally resided for 
fi ve years in the territory of a Member State.
3) Alistair Ager and Alison Strang, “Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework” 21(2)(2008) 
J of Refugee Studies, p. 166. 
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integration which are emphasised, and to some extent the form of the concept 
itself, depend on the facts of the individual case. In addition, and even more 
importantly, the weight given to integration considerations in the balancing exer-
cise undergone by the Court in each case each case is variable. Th is is because 
integration in itself is not the primary focus of the Court’s reasoning. Th e impli-
cations of the Court’s reasoning from the integration perspective remain for the 
moment incidental to the broader issues in these cases. Th is means that the impact 
of the Court’s development of the concept of integration on the key practical 
issues of the right to remain in a State Party and family unity remains limited. 
Finally, it is argued – by reference to the family reunifi cation cases in particular – 
that these cases are underscored by the wide margin of appreciation aff orded to 
states. In the context of the admissions category, it is suggested that the diffi  cul-
ties of the Court in delineating the extent of the positive obligations of States 
under Article 8 is illustrative of the fundamental diffi  culties attached to using 
international law in the integration sphere. It thus remains questionable whether 
the ECHR as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court will have a meaningful impact 
on the integration policies of European states. 
2. Diffi  culties with Defi ning the Concept of Integration
Integration is a contested and controversial concept, with some commentators 
seeing its premise as representing a rejection of diversity by migrant receiving 
societies.4 Integration is often associated with assimilation and discrimination, a 
frame of analysis which has become increasingly relevant in the context of the use 
of the concept of ‘integration’ by many European states as a norm in immigration 
law – a mandatory condition for entry to the state or access to social welfare and 
residency rights.5 At the same time however, competing narratives of integration 
centred on holistic, two-way conceptions of integration continue to emerge from 
NGOs and academics.6 Th e disjuncture between the way in which governments 
and other organisations interpret the concept of integration permeates the inte-
gration debate. 
Th e meaning, scope and implications of ‘integration’ thus remain controver-
sial. For the purposes of this article, the defi nition of integration employed by the 
4) Elspeth Guild, Th e Legal Elements of European Identity: EU Citizenship and Migration Law (Kluwer 
Law International, 2004), p. 234.
5) Anja Wiesbrock, “Discrimination Instead of Integration? Integration Requirements in Denmark and 
Germany”, in Elspeth Guild, Kees Groenendijk and Sergio Carrera, Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, 
Citizenship and Integration in the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), p. 299. 
6) See for example Rosa DaCosta, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and 
Recommendations, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (UNHCR, June 2006); Alistair 
Ager and Alison Strang, “Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework” 21(2)(2008) J of Refugee 
Studies, p. 166. 
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EU in the Common Basic Principles (“CBPs”) for integration will be used as a 
working defi nition and reference point. Integration is defi ned as a “dynamic, two-
way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Mem-
ber States”;7 and the CBPS also set out the basic requirements of integration: 
respect for the basic values of the European Union,8 including the diversity of 
cultures and religions;9 and a basic knowledge of the host society’s language, his-
tory and institutions.10 Key integration issues are termed as including access to 
employment,11 education12 and access to institutions on an equal basis to national 
citizens13 are identifi ed. Th is working defi nition is employed with the caveat that 
EU law and policy has been criticised as diverging from this inclusive model,14 
and it is arguable that the EU approach to integration replicates in many ways the 
defi cits of national approaches to integration.15
3. Interactions between Article 8 and Integration 
While immigrants’ human rights are protected by various articles of the ECHR, 
with the Convention applying to all persons on the territory of a State Party,16 the 
Article 8 expulsion and admission cases involve a direct clash of immigrants’ 
desire to reside in a State Party and States’ right to control immigration and resi-
dence. Th ese two interlinked strands of case law are directly linked to integration 
in diff erent ways. Th e expulsion cases have largely concerned ‘integrated aliens’17 
and/or second-generation immigrants: migrants who have lived for a long period 
of time in the host country (in some cases their whole lives), whom the State is 
seeking to expel from its territory on public order grounds following a criminal 
conviction. Th e second category of cases relates to the positive obligations inher-
ent in Article 8 and concerns the situation where an applicant in a Contracting 
State maintains that the refusal of that State to allow the entry of a member of his 
 7) Common Basic Principle (“CBP”) 1.
 8) CBP 2.
 9) CBP 8.
10) CBP 4.
11) CBP 3.
12) CBP 5.
13) CBP 6.
14) Clíodhna Murphy, “Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in European Union Law: the Position 
of Th ird-Country Nationals”, (2008–2009) 8(1) Hibernian LJ, p. 155. 
15) Sergio Carrera and Anja Wiesbrock, Civic Integration of Th ird-Country Nationals: Nationalism Versus 
Europeanisation in the Common EU Immigration Policy (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies 
2009).
16) Article 1 provides that “Th e High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defi ned in Section 1 of this Convention,” thus making no general distinction 
between citizens and non-citizens. 
17) A phrase used by Judge Morenilla in his partial dissent to Nasri v France (1996) EHRR 458 (para. 4); 
see also dissenting opinion of Judge Martens in Boughanemi v France (1996) 22 EHRR 228 (para. 1).
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family fails to respect his family life. While integration is not expressly discussed 
in these cases in the same fashion, family reunifi cation is a central integration 
theme and these cases are thus crucial in examining integration more broadly. 
3.1. Th e Expulsion Cases: Developing the Concept of Integration
It is well-established that a decision to expel a non-national from a Contracting 
State may raise an issue under Article 8 if it would disrupt family or private life in 
that State. As noted above, many of these cases which have come before the Court 
have concerned ‘integrated’ or second-generation immigrants who have lived for 
long periods of time in the host state. Integration has thus featured as an impor-
tant part of the reasoning of the Court in the Article 8 expulsion cases. Th e Stras-
bourg Court has placed a strong emphasis on integration, in particular the social 
aspects of integration, in deciding whether the expulsion fails to respect the indi-
vidual’s private and family life. It will be shown that the Court’s jurisprudence has 
gradually evolved to the point of assessing complex questions of the applicant’s 
social and cultural ties and economic links to the Contracting State, in addition 
to the more straightforward issue of family ties.
Th e Court assesses these cases on a case-by-case basis rather than treating long-
term immigrants as a special category whose expulsion would require exceptional 
circumstances.18 Th is case-by-case approach led to particularly haphazard results 
in the early cases, which was described as “a source of embarrassment for the 
Court” and a “lottery”.19 No clear thread of logic underlining the importance 
either the seriousness of the off ence or the applicant’s degree of integration or the 
looseness of the family ties is apparent in these cases, with the Court emphasising 
diff erent factors in each case.20 Since the 2001 judgment in Boultif v Switzer-
land 21 however, the Court has followed a more structured approach, applying a 
defi ned set of criteria to each case.22 At least three of these criteria are indirectly 
linked to the degree of integration of the individual in the host state: the duration 
of the individual’s stay, his or her family situation and diffi  culties that would be 
faced by the spouse in the country of origin. Th is last criterion incidentally intro-
duces a further integration dimension into the discussion (along with that of the 
18) On this point, see the judgments of Judge Martens and Judge Morenilla in Nasri. It was defi nitively 
confi rmed that the Court would not follow this approach in Uner v Th e Netherlands. 
19) Comments of Judge Martens in Boughanemi v France (1996) 22 EHRR 228 (para. 4). 
20) Charlotte Steinorth, “Uner v Th e Netherlands: Explusion of Long-Term Immigrants and the Right to 
Respect for Private and Family Life”, (2008) 8 (1) Hum Rts Law Rev 185, p. 186.
21) Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50.
22) Th ese criteria include: the nature and seriousness of the off ence committed; the duration of the indi-
vidual’s stay in the country from which he will be expelled; the time elapsed since the commission of the 
off ence and the applicant’s conduct during that period; the nationalities of the various persons concerned; 
the applicant’s family situation; and the seriousness of the diffi  culties the spouse would be likely to 
encounter in the country of origin.
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degree of integration of the person whom it is proposed to expel) as it essentially 
seeks to ascertain how diffi  cult it would be for the spouse to integrate into the 
country of origin. Regarding the duration of stay criterion, the Grand Chamber 
in Uner v Th e Netherlands23 explained its rationale as the assumption that the 
longer the individual stays, the closer the ties between the individual and the host 
state must be.24 In addition, the Grand Chamber in Uner v Th e Netherlands added 
two further criteria to the list of matters to be considered in these cases:
•  Th e best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the serious-
ness of the diffi  culties which any children of the applicant are likely to 
encounter in the country to which the applicant is likely to be expelled; 
and
•  Th e solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and the 
country of destination.25
In light of the above, the Court accepted as ‘self-evident’ that special regard should 
be had to the situation to the position of immigrants who had spent all or most 
of their life in the host country, had been raised there and received their education 
there.26 Th e question is therefore how this ‘special regard’ is to be exercised, and 
to what extent it will impact on the outcome of cases. 
In Uner then, the ECtHR placed increased emphasis on the fact of integration 
by including it as one of the express criteria to be applied by the courts.27 Th is was 
of course really nothing new as integration had implicitly been considered since 
the early cases – which looked at the links of the immigrant and their families to 
the host country including – inter alia – whether they were educated in the coun-
try, and the links to the country of origin including knowledge of the language 
and the presence of family in that country. Since Boultif, in particular, the Court 
had looked at the social ties which the person had established in the host coun-
try.28 However, the express recognition in Uner of a requirement to consider a 
23) (2007) 45 EHRR 14.
24) Ibid., at para. 58.
25) Ibid.
26) Ibid. 
27) Th is built in particular on the Court’s judgment in Benhebba v France (Application No. 53441/99) 
Judgment of 10 July 2003, which considered the Boultif criteria and added that as well as these factors, 
the person’s links with the host country where they had spent most of their life should be considered. 
Here, however, the ten-year exclusion from the country was found to be proportionate, with his links to 
the country outweighed in the balancing exercise by the severity of the off ence.
28) See Benhebba v France; Radovanovic v Austria (2005) 41 EHRR 6; Keles v Germany (2007) 44 EHRR 
12. Th is analysis of social ties in relation to second-generation immigrants and immigrants who come 
to the host country at a very young age is explained in Benhebba v France as follows: “Added to these 
(Boultif ) criteria, the links which these immigrants have formed with the host country in which they 
have spent most of their lives. Th ey received their education there, formed most of their social ties, and 
so developed most of their identité propre (own identity). Born or having arrived in the host country as a 
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person’s social and cultural ties opens the door to a balancing exercise of a com-
plexity which had not existed before this. Th e signifi cance of this development is 
two-fold: it constitutes an acknowledgement that Courts can become involved in 
assessing integration issues and the extent of a person’s integration; and also indi-
cates the basic implications of integration in terms of the ECHR – integration has 
the potential to impact on the legal security of residence of certain immigrants in 
certain circumstances. Th ym makes this point well: 
Th e resulting proportionality test will be much more complex than in cases concerning the ‘simple’ 
protection of family life and cover criteria whose interaction is not always straightforward in a plu-
rilateral balancing exercise. Decisive factors will include the integration into the labour market, 
dependence on social assistance, language skills as an indicator of social integration, criminal behav-
iour, and links with the country of origin or their absence and the duration of the stay in the host 
country. Here, the eight Boultif criteria may only be a starting point for a complex jurisprudence 
which the Court has only started to develop.29
I will now consider how integration is conceived by the Court and how the inte-
grated status of some immigrants has aff ected the Court’s analysis of their case in 
practice. 
4. Th e Scope and Content of the Integration Criterion
It is clear that integration is now one of the criteria to be considered by the Court, 
but the question of the scope and content of the concept of integration remains. 
Indications as to the content of the Court’s conception of integration are pro-
vided throughout the jurisprudence. Slivenko v Latvia30 – a case involving diff er-
ent considerations to the others under discussion here as none of the applicants 
had been convicted of any criminal off ence – contains an interesting discussion 
of the applicant’s integration in Latvia.31 Th e applicants were a family who had 
resided in Latvia almost all their lives but had become stateless when Latvia 
regained its independence in 1991, and were required to leave the country under 
a deportation order issued in respect of them as members of the family of a retired 
Russian military offi  cer. Th e Court rejected the claim of the Latvian Government 
result of their parent’s emigration, most of their family ties are there. Some of these immigrants have not 
maintained any link with their country of origin except for the fact of nationality” (para. 33).
29) Daniel Th ym, “Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration Cases: A 
Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?” (2008) 57 Int’l and Comp LQ 87, p. 92.
30) Slivenko v Latvia (Application No. 48321/99), Judgment of 9 October 2003 (GC).
31) Daniel Th ym presents an interesting analysis of Slivenko v Latvia, arguing that the Court re-concep-
tualizes family and private life; “the Court restricts its formerly wide understanding with a new focus on 
the ‘nuclear family’ of spouses and minor children, while at the same time broadening the protective reach 
of Article 8 ECHR to the network of personal, social and economic relations that make up the private life 
of every human being.” Daniel Th ym, loc. cit., p. 88. 
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that the applicants had not been suffi  ciently integrated into Latvian society.32 Th e 
Court fi rst observed that the applicants had spent virtually all their lives in Latvia. 
It also accepted that the applicants were not of Latvian origin, and that they 
arrived and lived in Latvia – then part of the USSR – in connection with the 
service of members of their family (the fi rst applicant’s father and her husband) in 
the Soviet armed forces. However, these factors were outweighed by the genuine 
and strong personal, social and economic links in Latvia.33 
In conclusion, the Court found that “at all times they were suffi  ciently inte-
grated into Latvian society”,34 and that in the circumstances, Article 8 was 
breached. Th is view of integration suggests that integration has occurred where 
the immigrant or settler forges personal, social and economic ties with the host 
society by living among the community, being educated and working in this 
community. In other words, simply being in the country on a long-term basis and 
living and working among its citizens was seen as the main indicator of integra-
tion. Th e Court did not require the applicants to reject or renounce their country 
or language of origin in order to evidence their integration.
Th is approach has not been echoed in the cases involving convicted criminal 
off enders, as will be seen below. It should also be noted that Slivenko was also 
somewhat unusual in that the Court has rarely discussed ‘integration’ as such, 
but has used the vocabulary of ‘ties to the host country’ and ‘ties to the country 
of origin’ to assess this. Overall, the Court has viewed a number of key factors 
as relevant in their consideration of integration. Th ese are: the acquisition of 
nationality; links to the country of nationality; language; and labour market 
integration. 
4.1. Attempts to Acquire Nationality
One of the questions which the Court will ask is as to the reasons why the indi-
vidual did not have nationality of the host country and most importantly, the 
issue of whether they entitled to nationality of the host country and if so, whether 
they made eff orts to obtain such nationality. In Boughanemi v France,35 Court 
stated that the applicant “kept his Tunisian nationality and, so it would seem, 
never manifested a wish to become French. It is probable, as the Government 
pointed out, that he retained links with Tunisia that went beyond the mere fact 
of his nationality. Before the Commission he did not claim that he could not 
32) Para. 88.
33) In the words of the Court: “the applicants also developed personal, social and economic ties in Latvia 
unrelated to their status as relatives of Soviet (and later Russian) military offi  cers. Th is is shown by the fact 
that the applicants did not live in army barracks or any other restricted area, but in a block of fl ats in 
which there were also civilians. Nor did they study or work in a military institution. Th e fi rst applicant 
was able to fi nd employment in Latvian companies after Latvia regained its independence in 1991.”
34) Para. 123.
35) (1996) 22 EHRR 228.
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speak Arabic, or that he had cut all his ties with his country of birth, or that he 
had not returned there after his deportation.”36 In Kaya, the Court did not accept 
the applicant’s claim that even had he applied for German nationality, he would 
have been unsuccessful.37
Th is approach places great symbolic importance on the acquisition of national-
ity as an indicator of integration. However, it fails to recognise the reality (admit-
tedly changing but that still persists) of migrants in countries such as France and 
Germany maintaining their original nationality even through to the second gen-
eration of migrants, a tradition stemming from the initial belief that such workers 
were temporary ‘guestworkers’.38 
4.2. Links to the Country of Nationality
Th e Court assesses the strength of the applicant’s links to the country of national-
ity asking questions such as: have they got family in the country of origin? Did 
they often return there, or holiday there? Th e rationale for this is that the interfer-
ence with private and family life is not so drastic where the person has real links 
with the country of origin.39 Th is ties in with the consideration of the duration 
of the individual’s stay in the host country, however – as can be seen from the 
cases – the fact that the applicant has lived virtually all his or her life in the host 
state does not always mean that the links to the country of origin have been sev-
ered in the view of the Court. Th e jurisprudence shows that relatively tenuous 
links have been seen to establish signifi cant ties to the country of origin. 
If one takes Baghli v France by way of example, this becomes clear. Th e appli-
cant entered France in 1967 at the age of two and, with the exception of the 
period he spent doing his military service in Algeria, lived there until he was 
excluded in 1994. He had received all his schooling there and worked there for 
several years. Nevertheless, the fact that he had done military service in Algeria, 
had been on holidays there and “never suggested that he cannot speak Arabic”, 
coupled with his lack of desire to become French, led the Court to the conclusion 
that the applicant had preserved ties with his native country.40 Similarly, in Uner 
v Th e Netherlands, the Grand Chamber opined that:
36) See also C v Belgium, and Baghli v France (2001) 33 EHRR 32.
37) Kaya v Germany, para. 64. 
38) For a discussion of the long-term eff ects of the early policies in France and Germany, see Pascale 
Fournier and Gökçe Yurdakul, “Unveiling Distribution: Muslim Women with Headscarves in France and 
Germany”, in Michael Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul (eds), Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos (Macmillan, 
2006).
39) See C v Belgium; Dalia v France (2001) 33 EHRR 26. 
40) Para. 48.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/22/2020 10:31:46AM
via Maynooth University
32 C. Murphy / European Journal of Migration and Law 12 (2010) 23–43
while it is true that the applicant came to the Netherlands at a relatively young age, the Court is not 
prepared to accept that he had spent so little time in Turkey that, at the time he was returned to that 
country, he no longer had any social or cultural (including linguistic) ties with Turkish society.41 
In short, the Court attempts to determine whether the nationality of that country 
is merely a legal fact or if it refl ects certain emotional and social links,42 in order 
to ascertain whether the person has become so “estranged” from the country that 
they would not be able to settle there.43 On the basis of the above cases, it seems 
that the Court will readily imply these emotional and social links and will rarely 
conclude that the estrangement is so complete as to render settling in the country 
of nationality impossible. For the sake of completeness, however, it is necessary to 
refer to Mehemi v France44 – one of the few cases in which the Court accepted that 
the applicant had no links with the country of origin other than nationality. Th is 
was a somewhat exceptional situation in that the applicant had been born in 
France and had had French nationality until he was a year old, losing it only 
because his father failed to complete the correct formalities. He was also married 
to a French national and had three minor children of French nationality. In the 
circumstances, the Court was compelled to accept that he had no links with Alge-
ria beyond nationality. 
4.3. Language
A further subsidiary question which is linked to the consideration of the extent of 
the individual’s ties to the host country is the extent of the individual and the 
aff ected family members’ linguistic ties to the country of nationality. In many 
cases the Court has employed the applicant’s knowledge of the language of their 
country of nationality as a relevant factor in the balancing process, with linguistic 
ties featuring in the Court’s reasoning to varying eff ect.45 In Kaya v Germany,46 
the applicant went to great lengths to protest that he knew no Turkish; however 
the Court placed importance that he had written letters to his mother from prison 
in Turkish, even though he insisted that he had dictated them to a cell-mate. In 
Beldjoudi, emphasis was placed on the fact that the applicant appeared not to 
41) Para. 63. See also C v Belgium. 
42) Dalia v France (2001) 33 EHRR 26, para. 53. Th e Court concluded that as the applicant had lived in 
Algeria until the age of 17 or 18, for two years without her parents, she had maintained certain family 
relations, spoken the local language and established social and school relationships. In those circum-
stances, the Court concluded that her Algerian nationality was not merely a legal fact but refl ected certain 
social an emotional links. See also Baghli v France (2001) 33 EHRR 32, para. 48; Boulchekia v France 
(1998) 25 EHRR 686, paras. 46 and 50. 
43) Keles v Germany, para. 62.
44) For the same situation with regard to nationality and links to the country of origin, see also Bel djoudi 
v France, in which the Court also accepted that he had no links to Algeria apart from that of nationality.
45) See for example Baghli v France; Dalia v France. 
46) Application No. 31753/02, Judgment of 28 June 2007.
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know Arabic (he had been born and educated in France) in concluding that he 
had no links with Algeria apart from that of nationality.47 In addition, his wife 
could not be expected to follow her husband to Algeria, “a State whose language 
she probably does not know”.48 In the same vein, in Keles v Germany, while the 
Court presumed that the applicant was familiar with the Turkish language, the 
applicant’s children could not be expected to follow him to Turkey,49 even though 
they were Turkish nationals and probably spoke some Turkish as:
Even if the children should have knowledge of the Turkish language, they would necessarily have to 
face major diffi  culties with regard to the diff erent language of instruction and the diff erent curricu-
lum in Turkish schools.50 
In these circumstances, Article 8 was violated by the applicant’s expulsion.51 
4.4. Labour Market Integration 
Interestingly, in a number of cases the Court has looked at the extent of the 
applicant’s integration into the labour market of the host country thus bringing 
economic links into the equation. Th e Court often takes into account whether a 
person had worked in the host country as part of their ties to the host country.52 
In Uner, the Grand Chamber considered whether the applicant who had lived in 
Germany since age twelve had integrated into the labour market.53 In Kaya v 
Germany, the Court considered that even though the applicant had been born 
and spent all his life in Germany, it could not overlook the fact that he was not 
integrated into the labour market as had never worked, but lived off  money 
extorted from his former partner.54 Finally, as pointed out above, the fact that the 
husband/father has been working in Latvian companies post-independence was 
also considered to be an indicator of integration in Slivenko v Latvia.55 On one 
level, this is an interesting endorsement of inclusion in the labour market as an 
important instrument of integration and recognises to an extent that occupational 
47) Para. 77. See also the discussion of Beldjoudi at note 40 above. 
48) Para. 78.
49) Th e applicant’s spouse, however, was Turkish and having arrived in Germany at the age of ten, it 
was “assumed that she has suffi  cient links which would allow her to re-integrate into Turkish society” 
(para. 63).
50) Para. 66. 
51) For similar reasoning, see (as discussed above) Amrollahi, in which it was accepted that the applicant’s 
mother tongue was Farsi however the Court concluded that in spite of this the applicant could not be 
considered to have maintained strong ties to Iran. In addition, and most signifi cantly, the wife spoke none 
of the language. 
52) See for example C v Belgium; Baghli v France. However, it was not a signifi cant factor in either of these 
cases and no violation of Article 8 was found in either case. 
53) Para. 65.
54) Ibid.
55) Application No. 48321/99, Judgment of 9 October 2003 (GC).
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or economic ties form a part of integration. However, it seems unfair to consider 
this in the abstract without looking at the background causes of unemployment 
and marginalisation. In addition, it seems that this consideration carries more 
weight in its negative sense as further illustration of the lack of contribution 
which the applicant makes to the host society: there are few examples of where 
positive engagement in the labour market was seen as a signifi cant factor which 
rendered the individual more integrated and thus more diffi  cult to remove from 
the host country.56 
5. An Emerging Integration Paradigm 
Th e above analysis reveals a specifi c conception of integration which appears to be 
a composite of strong links to the host country and an absence of strong links to 
country of origin. Th e Court is involved in a double-sided inquiry looking at two 
fundamental questions: 
1.  how integrated is the applicant and his family in the host country and to 
what extent does the expulsion consequently interfere with private and 
family life in that country; and 
2.  how diffi  cult would it be for the applicant and his family to re-integrate 
into the country of nationality? 
Th is approach would seem to require migrants to relinquish the identity of their 
country of origin in order to secure their place in the host society. Th is is prob-
lematic from a number of perspectives. First, it runs contrary to modern concep-
tions of integration which stress that immigrants are entitled to maintain their 
cultural and linguistic identity.57 In terms of international human rights law, this 
view of integration would appear incompatible with – inter alia – the rights of 
56) In C v Belgium the Court acknowledged that the applicant had established social ties in Belgium, 
amongst other things by working there for a number of years (para. 32). However, this was outweighed 
by the seriousness of the off ences in question and his persisting links to Morocco (para. 34 and 35). 
However, see Boultif v Switzerland, where the applicant had worked as a painter and at various other jobs 
and had the possibility of further employment. Th is, along with his exemplary conduct in prison, miti-
gated fears that he constituted a danger to public order and security for the future (para. 51). Similarly, 
in Keles a violation of Article 8 was found, and the fact that he had been employed for a certain period of 
time in Germany was referred to, although this was not considered by the Court as one of the particular 
factors which leaned in favour of the applicant. 
57) See Council of Europe, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue (2008), p. 6; UNHCR’s defi nition of 
integration as set out in UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Local Integration (No. 104 (LVI) 
2005), preamble and (k); and in the EU sphere, “Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Th ird Annual Report on Migration and Integration” (Brussels 11.09.2007, COM (2007) 512 
fi nal), p. 3.
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minorities as guaranteed by Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights and the prohibition of racial discrimination in CERD.58 On a 
practical level, it also fails to recognise the increasing reality of dual nationalities 
and transnational belonging and identities.59 
Another conclusion which follows on from this is that the ECtHR places the 
onus of integration squarely on the migrant. Th e migrant as seen as the sole agent 
of integration with responsibility for establishing links with the host country. 
Th is is clear particularly in relation to the Court’s consideration of an individual’s 
integration into the labour market. Th e State is not seen as having any responsi-
bility for undertaking to integrate the person into the fabric of the host society. 
Th is is partly explicable by the fact that the Court focuses on social and personal 
integration. However, for a diff erent slant on this question, see the comments of 
Judge Morenilla in his partial dissent in Nasri v France:
A State which, for reasons of convenience, accepts immigrant workers and authorises their residence 
becomes responsible for the education and social integration of the children of such immigrants as 
it is of the children of its ‘citizens’. Where such social integration fails, and the result is antisocial or 
criminal behaviour, the State is also under a duty to make provision for their social rehabilitation 
instead of sending them back to their country of origin, which has no responsibility for the behav-
iour in question and where the possibilities of rehabilitation in a foreign social environment are 
virtually non-existent.
On this view, the Court through these judgments allows Governments to abdi-
cate their responsibility for education and social integration to a State in which 
the person concerned has, in most cases, never lived or lived for a very short 
period of time. However, to follow Judge Morenilla’s reasoning would involve the 
Court in complex issues of social, economic rights and social exclusion, a course 
which it would be unlikely to favour. In this way, the cases under discussion argu-
ably serve to highlight the limitations of reliance on civil and political rights to 
deal with what at root may be social and economic problems.60 Th e rather one-
sided conception of integration being developed by the Court also constitutes a 
58) In relation to Article 27 of the ICCPR and integration, see the Concluding Observations of the UN 
Human Rights Committee in relation to Albania (E/C.12/ALB/CO/1, 24 November 2006 para. 21); 
Germany (E/C.12/1/Add.68, 24 September 2001, para. 21); and Greece (E/C.12/1/Add.97, 7 June 2004, 
para. 18). In relation to CERD, the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is at 
pains to emphasise that integration does not imply or allow for forced assimilation (see the Concluding 
Observations of the Committee in relation to Turkmenistan (CERD/C/TKM/CO/5, 27 March 2007), 
Germany (CERD/C/DEU/CO/18, 21 August 2008) and Japan (CERD/C/304/Add.114, 27 April 2001)). 
Furthermore, integration policies should not discourage members of minority groups from expressing 
their culture (Concluding observations relating to Denmark (CERD/C/DEN/CO/17, 19 October 2006)). 
59) On transnationalism and dual citizenship, see for example Nancy Poner, “Engagement Across National 
Borders: Th en and Now”, (2006–2007) 75 Fordham L Rev 2483; and Linda Bosniak, “Multiple Citizen-
ship and the Postnational Transformation of Citizenship”, (2001–2002) 42 Va J Int’l L 979. p. 981. 
60) Ann Sherlock makes this point well in her commentary on the Article 8 cases, suggesting that the 
applicants in these cases perhaps emphasise purely family life as problems of social exclusion and high 
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point of divergence from most defi nitions of integration, which emphasise the 
“two-way” nature of the integration process. Th e defi nition of integration con-
tained in the CBPs and set out above, for example, emphasises the responsibilities 
of the host state to ensure access to education, citizenship and the institutions of 
the host society, as well as the individual migrants’ responsibility in the integration 
process. Th is divergence stems from the context in which the Court is considering 
the concept of integration: that of the proposed deportation of individuals. 
6. Th e Prominence of the Dissenting Judgments in the Article 8 Cases 
Th e comments of Judge Morenilla quoted above form part of the strong line of 
dissents which have characterised the Article 8 immigration case law since its 
inception. One of the distinctive features of this jurisprudence is the high degree 
of disagreement between the judges of the Strasbourg Court on fundamental 
aspects of the legal reasoning to be employed in determining these cases. In the 
early cases, the divisions centred round two fundamental points. Th e fi rst of these 
was the uncertainty caused by adopting a case-by-case approach and the unpre-
dictability this was causing. Th is has been remedied to a certain degree by the 
development of the Boultif criteria as discussed above. Th e second, more funda-
mental, area of disagreement concerned the correct approach to the legal status of 
long-term immigrants in these circumstances, with a number of judges passion-
ately arguing that such individuals should be protected against deportation save 
in the most extreme circumstances. Over ten years since the fi rst wave of cases, it 
now appears to be settled that this will not be the approach taken by the Court, 
with the Court’s reasoning proceeding on the assumption that long-term immi-
grants do not form a discrete legal category. 
More recently, the case law remains characterised by deep disagreement. In the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment in Uner, the three dissenting judges (Judges Costa, 
Zupancic and Turmen) found in contrast to the majority that an assessment of 
the criteria pointed to a violation of Article 8. Th is is illustrative of the new dif-
fi culties posed by the development of a set of criteria without a clear indication of 
the relative weight of these criteria: a key issue which is discussed further in the 
next section. More fundamentally, the minority opinion referred back to the old 
question of the status of long-term residents, arguing that “foreign nationals – in 
any case those who, like Mr Üner, have been residing legally in a country – should 
be granted the same fair treatment and a legal status as close as possible to that 
accorded to nationals”.61 Th e minority further argues that the majority judgment 
unemployment may make somewhat unusual any cases where ‘private life’ is the dominant feature. See 
Ann Sherlock, loc. cit., p. 6.
61) Minority opinion, para. 5.
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fails to construe Article 8 in light of other international texts dealing with the 
rights of long-term immigrants.62 Th is continuing debate over such a founda-
tional issue indicates the indeterminacy of international law relating to the legal 
status and rights of non-citizens. 
7. Th e Relative Weight of Integration in the Balancing Exercise
Leaving aside for a moment the precise scope and meaning of the integration 
criterion, it is unclear how much weight it will actually be given in the balancing 
exercise undertaken by the Court in each case. Th e failure to address this lacuna 
has been seen as one of the major failings of the Uner judgment.63 One of the key 
factors which may tip the balance in favour of the State is the severity of the 
off ence in question. In Boulchekia v France,64 the fact that the applicant had been 
living in France since the age of two, and had received all his education in France 
was outweighed by the severity of the crime of aggravated rape which he had 
committed as a minor, outweighed this.65 Th e Court has viewed drugs off ences as 
particularly serious, aff ording governments a considerable margin of discretion in 
dealing with drug off enders by deportation.66 Th is approach is perhaps under-
standable, as some of these cases involve individuals who clearly pose a threat to 
public security and order and if States could expel citizens who had committed 
similar off ences, they most probably would. 
However, the severity of the off ence has not consistently trumped the other 
considerations. If we compare a number of judgments this becomes apparent. In 
Mehemi v France, the applicant received a permanent exclusion order after being 
convicted of cannabis dealing – a serious crime in the view of the Court. How-
ever, he had been born in France and had two French children and an Italian wife. 
It was found that, despite the severity of the off ence, his family life would be 
disproportionately interfered with by the expulsion. In contrast, in Baghli v France 
the severity of the off ence (the ‘severity’ of which was questionable: the applicant 
62) Th ese texts included the Conclusions of the Presidency of the Tampere European Council on 15 and 
16 October 1999; Th e Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2000)15, Par-
liamentary Assembly Recommendation 1504 (2001) and Committee of Ministers Recommendation 
Rec(2002); and the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
63) See Charlotte Steinorth, loc. cit. 
64) Boulchekia v France 1997-I 47; (1998) 25 EHRR 686.
65) See also Boughanemi where the serious nature of the off ences in question (including living on the earn-
ings of prostitution with aggravating circumstances) was taken into account. Conversely, in Moustaquim, 
the Court emphasised the minor nature of the off ences in question in deciding that the expulsion would 
breach Article 8 (para. 44). In Ezzhoudi v France, the off ences were similarly minor, and this played a large 
part in the reasoning of the Court. 
66) Th e Court has expressed the view that “In view of the devastating eff ects drugs have on people’s lives, 
the Court understands why the authorities show great fi rmness to actively contribute to the spread of this 
scourge” (Amrollahi v Denmark, para. 37); see also for example Dalia v France, para. 92. 
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had been sentenced to three years imprisonment, two of which were suspended, 
for dealing in a small quantity of heroin) was not similarly outweighed by the 
other circumstances of the case, even though, as in Mehemi, the applicant had 
entered France aged two, and “his main family and social ties are in France”.67 
Th e Court laid emphasis that in this case the exclusion was for the determinate 
period of ten years, and thus would constitute less of an interference with the 
applicant’s rights.68 Th e real diff erence between these two cases appears to be the 
family status of the applicant: the applicant in Baghli was unmarried and had no 
children. Nevertheless, the family status of the applicant will not always be deter-
minative either. For example, in Uner the applicant had a Dutch partner and two 
sons in the Netherlands, with Dutch nationality. However, the Court did not 
accord as much weight to this as it had in previous cases, adopting a rather dis-
missive approach to the issue of the applicant’s family.69
One of the outstanding issues in relation to this case-law is thus the relative 
weight of the various factors. While integration is an important factor, it has been 
seen that it is often outweighed by the seriousness of the crime or the situation of 
the other members of the family. Many of the inconsistencies in the case-law arise 
from the ad hoc approach to the balancing exercise undertaken in each case, to the 
extent that:
Th e present approach of the ECtHR, . . ., leaves both prospective applicants and national authorities 
with little guidance as to whether an expulsion of a long-term immigrant will be deemed a propor-
tionate measure. It would thus be preferable for the ECtHR to take a clear stance as to whether it 
gives primary signifi cance to the legitimate interests of States in securing public order or to the right 
of long-term immigrants to remain in their host country.70 
If the Court were to assign greater weight to the criterion of “the solidity of social, 
cultural and family ties with the host country and the country of destination”, 
long-term immigrants would almost certainly enjoy greater security of residence 
in the host country. 
7.1. Th e Admission Cases: Family Reunifi cation
Th e typical admission case has concerned the situation where an applicant in a 
Contracting State maintains that the refusal of that State to allow the entry of a 
67) Para. 48.
68) Judges Costa and Tulkens issued strong dissents on this point, noting that ten years is long enough for 
a person’s family and social life in the host country to be obliterated. 
69) Th e Court remarked that: “Th e Court concurs with the Chamber in its fi nding that at the time the 
exclusion order became fi nal, the applicant’s children were still very young – six and one and a half years 
old respectively – and thus of an adaptable age (see paragraph 46 of the Chamber judgment). Given that 
they have Dutch nationality, they would – if they followed their father to Turkey – be able to return to 
the Netherlands regularly to visit other family members residing there (para. 64).
70) Charlotte Steinorth, loc. cit., p. 196.
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member of his family (most often a child) fails to respect his right to family life. 
In conceptual terms, the distinguishing feature of these cases is therefore that they 
concern a positive obligation of the State rather than the negative obligation at 
play in the expulsion cases. As the Court has reiterated:
. . . the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public 
authorities. Th ere may in addition be positive obligations inherent in eff ective ‘respect’ for family 
life. However, the boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under this provi-
sion (art. 8) do not lend themselves to precise defi nition. Th e applicable principles are, nonetheless, 
similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the 
State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.71
Th is passage suggests that the principles to be applied in relation to the negative 
and positive obligations contained in Article 8 are broadly similar. In the early 
admission cases in particular, however, the Court took a very restrictive approach 
towards applicants making this type of claim, aff ording states a wide margin of 
appreciation in determining whether a positive obligation existed at all. Th e 
Court stated in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, the fi rst of these cases, that:
as far as positive obligations are concerned, the notion of ‘respect’ is not clear-cut: having regard to 
the diversity of the practice followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the 
notion’s requirements will vary considerably from case to case.72
Th e jurisprudence of the Court shows that the State’s right to control the entry of 
non-nationals into its territory will rarely be out-weighed by the circumstances of 
the individual applicants. First, the Court has been clear in its position that Arti-
cle 8 does not impose on a State “a general obligation to respect the choice by 
married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to authorise 
family reunion in its territory”.73 In assessing the circumstances of the applicants, 
the Court will consider whether admission is the only way to develop true family 
life: are there are insurmountable obstacles to setting up family life in the country 
of origin? Th is is a high hurdle for applicants to overcome, as illustrated by Gul 
v Switzerland 74 and the subsequent case of Ahmut v Th e Netherlands.75 In the 
71) Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) EHRR 471, para. 67.
72) Para. 67. Essentially, as Warbrick observes, the Court collapses the examination of whether there is a 
positive obligation under Article 8(1) with the question of whether it has been breached (which is an 
Article 8(2) matter), resulting in incoherence. Warbrick, p. 39. 
73) Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) EHRR 471; Gul v Th e Netherlands 
(1996) 22 EHRR 93; Ahmut v Netherlands (1996) 24 EHRR 62; Sen v Th e Netherlands Application 
No. 31465/96, Judgment of 21 December 2001.
74) (1996) 22 EHRR 93. It is particularly diffi  cult for applicants to succeed where the separation was 
caused by a deliberate and voluntary decision on the behalf of the parent or parents, as was the case in 
Ahmut.
75) (1996) 24 EHRR 62.
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controversially harsh decision in Sen, the Court found that while the circum-
stances of the family in question were compelling “very diffi  cult from the human 
point of view”,76 there was no such obligation in this case as there were “strictly 
speaking, no obstacles preventing them from developing family life in Turkey”.77 
A similar approach was taken in Ahmut v Th e Netherlands,78 in which the father 
had actually obtained Dutch nationality.79 
It seems that one circumstance in which the Court will fi nd that insurmount-
able obstacles exist to settling in the country of origin is where the applicant(s) 
have started a family in the host country and other children have been born or 
substantially brought up in that country. Here the Court acknowledges that the 
State’s decision eff ectively requires the applicants to choose between their chil-
dren in the host country and those in the country of origin, compelling an impos-
sible choice which does not respect the applicants’ right to family life.80 Th is 
formed the basis of the reasoning of the Court in Sen v Th e Netherlands81 and 
Tuquabo-Tekle v Th e Netherlands,82 which seemed to signal a shift towards a less 
restrictive attitude of the Court towards these cases.83 However, the limited num-
ber of cases which make it past the admissibility stage illustrates how diffi  cult it 
remains to succeed in these cases.84 
8. Limited Consideration of Integration Issues in the Family Reunifi cation 
Context
Integration is not as signifi cant an issue in the admission cases as in the expulsion 
cases considered above. Th is is logical as the child has not, for the most part, 
76) Para. 42.
77) Para. 42. In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Martens criticised what he viewed as the artifi cial dis-
tinction drawn by the majority between positive and negative obligations, and concluded that the inter-
ference with family life in this case was disproportionate and violated Article 8, particularly as it eff ectively 
required the parents to chooses between renouncing their son and renouncing their daughter who was 
settled in Switzerland. In his view, there had to be a limit to the Court’s deference to domestic immigra-
tion law and policy (para. 9).
78) (1996) 24 EHRR 62.
79) Th ere were four dissenting judges in this case, including Judge Valticos who stopped just short of 
accusing the Dutch government of racism, given that the father in this case was a Dutch national.
80) Sen v Th e Netherlands, para. 41.
81) Application No. 31465/96, Judgment of 21 December 2001.
82) Application No. 60665/00, Judgment of 1 December 2005. 
83) See Nicola Rogers, “Immigration and the European Convention on Human Rights: Are New Princi-
ples Emerging?”, (2003) Eur Hum Rts L Rev 53, p. 64, where the author expresses the opinion that the 
Sen case signalled a “move away from state interests engendered by a greater emphasis on the need to 
fulfi l positive as well as negative obligations under Article 8”. 
84) See for example Benamar v the Netherlands (dec.), Application No. 43786/04, 5 April 2005; I.M. v. 
the Netherlands (dec.), Application No. 41266/98, 25 March 2003; and Chandra and Others v the 
Netherlands (dec.), Application No. 53102/99, 13 May 2003. 
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entered the receiving country yet and so no question of his or her integration 
could arise. Th e Court considers the extent of the child’s “cultural and linguistic 
links” to the country of origin in determining the viability of developing family 
life in that country.85 It also considers the child’s degree of dependence on the 
parents,86 and in this context, the age of the children may be an important fac-
tor.87 Interestingly however (and as touched upon in the previous paragraph), in 
cases of split families where there are children which have been brought up in the 
host country, the Court may also consider their degree of integration in the host 
country in order to ascertain the impact on them of moving to the country of 
origin to join the other family members. In Sen v the Netherlands, the Court con-
sidered that the two children who had been born and grown up in the Nether-
lands and were receiving their schooling there had few or no links to the country 
of origin aside from the legal fact of nationality, and in these circumstances the 
most appropriate way to develop true family life was to allow the entry of the son 
who was in Turkey.88 In this limited sense, there is a certain degree of overlap here 
with the expulsion cases considered above. 
It seems that it is only in a very narrow set of circumstances that the Court will 
compel a State to authorise family reunifi cation on the basis of Article 8. Further-
more, even though the Court has insisted that the same principles are applicable 
in the case of the negative and positive obligations under Article 8, it is clear that 
the Court is reluctant to fi rst of all fi nd that a positive obligation exists at all 
and secondly that the positive obligation is breached. Th is is consistent with 
the general observations made above in relation to the diffi  culties inherent in 
identifying and enforcing positive obligations in international law. Overall, my 
analysis of the family reunifi cation judgments of the ECtHR confi rms that in 
the specifi c fi eld of family reunifi cation, States are relatively unconstrained by 
the ECHR in their formulation of law and policy, and – more generally – that 
States have a wide margin of appreciation in matters relating to the entry and 
residence of non-nationals. 
As noted above, the Article 8 case-law has been criticised from both within the 
Court itself and by academic commentators for its incoherence and instability.89 
Th ese diffi  culties have arguably stemmed from the high degree of deference 
85) Gul, para. 42; Ahmut, para. 69; Sen, para. 37.
86) See for example Sen v Th e Netherlands, para. 37.
87) See Tuquabo-Tekle v Th e Netherlands, para. 49, where it is stated that “Th e Court has indeed previously 
rejected cases involving failed applications for family reunion and complaints under Article 8 where the 
children concerned had in the meantime reached an age where they were presumably not as much in need 
of care as young children and increasingly able to fend for themselves”. Th ese included Benamar v. the 
Netherlands, I.M. v. the Netherlands and Chandra and Others v. the Netherlands discussed above.
88) Para. 40.
89) In addition to the comments of the dissenting judges referred to above, see Catherine Dembour, 
“Human Rights Law and National Sovereignty in Collusion: Th e Plight of Quasi-nationals at Stras-
bourg”, (2003) 21 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, p. 63.
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shown to domestic immigration policy in the judgments of the Court, which has 
led to conceptual confusion to the point where “it is diffi  cult to extrapolate clear 
principles identifying the application of Article 8”.90 States are thus free to decide 
on the most appropriate way to deal with the key integration issue of family 
reunifi cation, providing they stay within the generous margin of appreciation 
delineated by the Court in Sen and Tuquabo-Tekle. Th is is perhaps indicative of 
the broader diffi  culties faced when applying international law in the integration 
context. Integration is by its nature an area involving the progressive realisation of 
rights, of positive rights involving complex and delicate issues of social policy 
closely related to issues of national identity and sovereignty. International law’s 
focus on negative obligations of States and leaving States room to manoeuvre 
arguably thus has a limited application in this context. 
9. Conclusions
Th e readiness of the Court in recent cases to explicitly protect long-term residents 
under the heading of private life involves the Court in a complex and nuanced 
balancing exercise which includes integration as one of the express criteria to be 
considered by the Court. Th is makes explicit the integration analysis in which the 
Court had been implicitly engaging since the early cases. While the jurisprudence 
relating to what actually constitutes ‘integration’ is very much in its infancy, the 
implications of this move extends beyond the circumstances of the applicants in 
these cases and signifi es the start of a normative development of the concept of 
integration by the European Court of Human Rights. Th is constitutes a valuable, 
legal, contribution to the emerging discourse on the nature, scope and implica-
tions of the integration of immigrants, all the more so given that the increasing 
trend across European states to use the concept of integration in a negative sense 
as a condition of citizenship and as a barrier to entry for immigrants and their 
family members. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the increased emphasis of the Court 
on the integration criterion in the expulsion cases infl uences the Court’s approach 
to key integration issues such as family reunifi cation and in turn whether this 
fi lters down to legislators and policymakers at the national level. In particular, the 
impact of the developing concept of integration on the outcome of the expulsion 
cases is variable and in some cases unclear, as the integration criterion is only one 
element of a complex balancing exercise undertaken by the Court.
In addition, it has been seen that the specifi c context in which the Court 
considers integration has led to some diff erences in the emerging integration 
90) Nicola Rogers, “Immigration and the European Convention on Human Rights: Are New Principles 
Emerging?”, (2003) Eur Hum Rts L Rev 53, p. 53. 
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paradigm employed by the Court and that put forward by the EU CBPs, for 
example. Th e one-sided approach of the Court to the notion of ‘integration’, 
placing the onus of integration principally on the individual concerned, has been 
criticised in this article.
Finally, as the admissions cases clearly demonstrate, the Court continues to 
operate within the restraints of Article 8 and in the awkward space between inter-
national obligations and states’ margin of appreciation in immigration matters, 
which raises the question of how far the ECtHR can hope to infl uence state prac-
tice in this sphere, particularly where the circumstances relate to positive obliga-
tions of States. 
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